When we talk about salaries in Syria, we’re not just talking about monthly figures employees receive, but rather about a long story of collapse in the value of work itself.
In 2000, the salary of a Syrian employee was limited, but it still retained part of its economic meaning. The government employee lived within a difficult but understandable equation: a modest salary, government support for bread, fuel, and electricity, nearly free education and healthcare, and a relatively stable exchange rate. In 2004, estimates spoke of an average government salary of about $200 per month before wage increases at that time, an increase that came in the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s rule.
But this number shouldn’t fool us. Even before the war, the Syrian salary was not truly comfortable. It was enough for survival, not for saving. It guaranteed a minimum level of stability, not prosperity. However, the difference is significant between a 2000 or 2010 employee and one today. The former received a modest salary within a functioning economy, while the latter receives a modest salary in an exhausted and torn economy.
Before 2011, the average monthly wages in some public industrial sector data peaked in dollars in 2011 at about $539, according to CEIC data covering monthly wages from 1993 to 2020. Then came the great collapse; in 2020, the figure fell to just $81, compared to $143 in 2019.
After 2011, the problem was not just the drop in salaries, but the destruction of the environment that gave the salary its value. The Syrian pound lost its strength, prices practically floated, subsidies shrank, electricity dwindled, transport costs soared, and health and education gradually became major financial burdens. The salary that used to cover a reasonable part of daily life now covers just a few days a month.
By 2023, the minimum wage in the public sector reached about 185,940 Syrian pounds, equivalent to approximately $13 at the time, while estimated living costs exceeded the minimum wage many times over. In 2024, despite a new increase, reports mentioned a minimum wage of about 280,000 Syrian pounds, or around $19.
After the downfall of the previous regime in December 2024, salaries entered a new phase. The transitional government spoke about restructuring the public sector, removing what it called “phantom employees,” and raising the slogan of increasing salaries. In January 2025, the Finance Minister said that public sector employees’ salaries under Assad were around $25 per month, and that the government planned to raise them significantly as an urgent attempt to restart the state.
Then came subsequent raises. In June 2025, a 200% increase in public sector salaries was announced, raising the minimum to about 750,000 Syrian pounds per month, or around $75 at the time. After that, in March 2026, a decree was issued for a further 50% increase in public sector salaries, with a new minimum set for some sectors not previously included in old salary scales.
But the most important economic question is not: How much did salaries increase? Rather: What can this salary actually buy?
Today, it can be said that Syria lives with three salary strata. The first group is the old government employee, whose salary in many cases is around 1.2 to 1.5 million Syrian pounds, less than $120 to $150 per month. The second group is new employees or contractors in state institutions, where some contracts start from $300—a double or triple what an old employee in the same position earns. The third group is employees of NGOs, the civil sector, and some private or tech companies, where salaries can rise to hundreds or even thousands of dollars, especially in international organizations, technology, media, or externally funded projects.
Here, the major paradox appears: Syria no longer has a single “salary market.” There is a government employee whose salary cannot cover basic food and transport needs, and there is an employee in an international organization or overseas-linked company making ten times or more. This disparity creates not just an economic gap but also a deep sense of injustice within the same institution, city, or even family.
In February 2025, the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimated the average public sector university graduate’s salary at about 580,000 pounds, compared to about 990,000 pounds in the private sector and about 2.16 million pounds in the civil sector. The data also showed that public sector wages covered only a very small part of the poverty line, and employees in government-controlled areas were among the most affected.
Thus, the transformation over the past quarter-century can be summarized as follows: In 2000, the Syrian salary was low but part of a relatively stable and supported system; in 2010, it could still grant employees a minimum standard of living; after 2011, it became a survival salary; and after 2020, it became in many cases just a symbolic payment for attendance at work. Today, after the raises, the nominal figure has improved, but the real value still depends on three factors: exchange rate, prices, and the state’s ability to unify the salary scale.
The problem, then, is not in the salary figure alone. The issue is that Syria moved from an economy in which the state distributed poverty fairly equally, to one where $10 salaries coexist with $1,000 salaries. Between these two stands the Syrian middle class, once the backbone of the state, education, and administration, but now a class struggling to survive, not to thrive.
It becomes clear that increasing salaries is necessary, but not sufficient. Any raise is worthless if devoured by inflation. A new salary scale is meaningless if the gap remains wide between old employees and new contractors. The rebuilding of the Syrian state cannot begin without restoring the value of work—not only through raising wages, but through controlling prices, reforming institutions, unifying pay scales, and linking real salaries to a life of dignity, not mere survival.
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